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SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 
LAW REVIEW 
VOL. III JUNE, 1930 No.5 
THE UNIVERSAL DRAFT AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
JOSEPH M. CORMACK* 
It is felt by many that it will· he a step toward the attainment of perma-
nent world peace if ways can he found to "take the profit out of war." A means 
which has been suggested to assist in this is the universal draft, i.e., conscrip-
tion of material resources as well as man power.1 Also, it has been suggested 
that the universal draft would he an equitable method of distribution of the 
sacrifices due to war. 
By a draft of material resources is meant something more than a com-
mandeering to he followed by the payment of full compensation. A taking is 
envisaged in connection with which the government would not he legally hound 
to make any compensation. It is not to he supposed that the government would 
not make some payment to the owner, hut its extent would he governed by con-
siderations of puhlie policy, and would have no necessary relation to the value 
of the property. This would he analogous to the existing situation in the con-
scription of man power, where the compensation of an individual in the mili-
tary service has no necessary relation to the value of his services in civil life. 
Most programs of social advance pass through nvo stages: first, the period 
of advocacy of the general principle; and, second, the working out of specific 
plans for putting the principle into operation. The suggestion of a universal 
draft has not yet passed beyond the :first stage. It seems reasonable to suppose, 
however, that the drafting of property would he effected through the issuance 
of orders to owners of property to deal with the government at fixed scales of. 
rents or other compensation. The valuations fixed would he designed to elimi-
nate any hope of profit. The liberality of the government in dealing with differ-
ent commodities would vary in so far as necessary to accomplish that purpose. 
• [Professor of Law, University of Southern California.] 
1United States Senator Clarence C. Dill, of the State of Washington, offered a resolu-
tion in the Senate January 25, 1930, proposing an amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion in the foll6wing terms: "Congress shall have power in time of war to take private 
property for public use and for purposes of national defense, and to fix the compensation 
by declaring the same to be necessary for purposes of national defense." S.J.Res. 128, 
Seventy-first Congressr 2nd Session. 72 Cong.Rec. 2449. 
On April 1, 1930, the House of Representatives passed H.J.Res. 251, To Promote 
Peace and to Equalize the Burdens and Minimize the Profits of War, providing for the 
appointment of a commission to make a complete study of the problem. 72 Cong.Rec. 6573. 
6633. For some remarks by Senator Dill, against the proposal, consult: (April 3, 1930) 72 
Cong.Rec. 6692. . 
The term "universal draft" is sometimes used in the sense of compulsory service of 
all adult persons, either generally or within certain age limits. Women may or may not be 
included. 
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Probably at the outset the progress of a draft of property would be marked 
not so much by the lowness of the valuations fixed as by the assurance of legal· 
ity of the proceedings taken. The national necessities as hostilities progressed 
would determine the extent to. which owners of property later might be called 
upon to sacrifice. As the country became accustomed to the new procedure it 
is likely that a public psychology would develop in support of the draft, insur-
ing its success. The result should be an important step toward removing the 
profit motive from the whole war situation. The operation of the universal 
draft would also lessen the size of the war debt, if it did not eliminate the neces· 
sity for its creation. . 
A universal draft resembles taxation in that it is a method of providing 
resources for the prosecution of a war; it differs from taxation in that it 
departs from the fundamental principle of equality upon which taxation is 
based. The basic principle of taxation is that each citizen, or member of a 
class of citizens, is to do his share toward the support of the government in pro· 
portion to his means.2 Under a universal draft the owner of property is called 
upon to make a sacrifice, less than that of the citizen who bears arms, but 
nevertheless a sacrifice. The process resembles eminent domain rather than 
taxation. The fundamental difference between taxation and eminent domain is 
that under the former each does his share, while under the latter the citizen 
gives more than his share and receives compensation.3 If the requirement of 
compensation which accompanies the process of eminent domain is to be 
escaped in the present connection, it is upon the ground of war necessity.• The 
method of approach to the legal problems relatJ.ng to a universal draft must 
be, not from the standpoint of taxation, but from that of war necessity and the 
constitutional provisions relating to war, the taking of private property for pub-
lic use, and due process of law. If the universal draft were to be considered 
a method of taxation, it would constitute a direct tax,G and be subject to appor· 
tionment among the states in proportion to their population,6 and assuredly no 
effective draft of property could comply with that requirement. 
The suggestion of a universal draft raises the question whether it could be 
effected by act of Congress, or whether an amendment to the United States Con· 
stitution would be required. The question arises because of the provision in 
the Fifth Amendment that private property shall not be taken for public use 
without just compensation, and also because of the more inclusive due-process· 
of-law clause in that amendment.7 A definite answer cannot be given, but the 
materials relating to the problem will be examined. 
Vattel, in 1758, set forth the basic principles in the light of which the 
words used in this portion of the Constitution must be interpreted. Asking the 
21 Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., 103. 
•1 Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., 102. 
•This will he developed later. 
61 Cooley, Taxation, 4th ed., 141 and 243. 
eu.S.Const. Art.!, §2, cl.3: "Representatives and direct Taxes shall he apportioned 
among the several States which may he included within this Union, according to their 
respective Numbers •••• " · 
7U.S.Const. Amend. V: "No person shall ••• he deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property he taken for publlc use, without 
just compensation." 
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question whether the state is hound to indemnify individuals for the damages 
they have sustained in war, he distinguished two classes of damage done by the 
state in time of war: that done deliberately and by way of precaution, as when 
land is taken so that fortifications may he erected upon it; and that done by 
reason of inevitable necessity-such as the destruction by artillery in retaking 
a town from the enemy. Damage of the first .class, he said, should he made 
good to the individual, who should hear only his quota of the loss. Damage of 
the latter class is merely an accident, a misfortune which chance deals out to 
those upon whom it happens to fall. Here no action lies against the sovereign. 
Such damage is to he treated in the same way as that done by the enemy. All 
subjects are as much exposed to such damage as they are to risk of life itself. 
It would he utterly impracticable for the state to attempt strictly to indemnify 
all those whose property is thus damaged. The public finances would soon he 
exhausted, and every individual would he obliged to contribute his share in 
due proportion. There would arise a thousand abuses, and there would he no 
end of the particulars, i.e., there would he no limit to the claims presented. 8 
Whatever may he thought of the sufficiency of the reasons assigned by 
Vattel, the distinction suggested by him between damage to property in the 
course of active military operations and other damage done by the State in time 
of war has been observed universally under the common law, at least since 
1660.9 The war powers of the nation have been thought to justify all damage 
in the course of active military operations/0 without compensation to the owner. 
Where property has otherwise been taken or injured, even though in time of 
war and for war purposes, full value has been paid. This has been done even 
where the urgency of the necessity has been felt to justify a summary taking 
8Vattel, The Law of Nations, Bk.3, c.15, §232, Chi tty-Ingraham trans., 402. Grotius, in a 
passage referred to by Vattel, said: "Nor do I admit, without distinction, what Vasquius 
says: that the state is not bound to acknowledge the damage which is inflicted by war, 
because the right of war permits such damage. For that right of war has regard to other 
peoples, as we have elsewhere explained; and, partly at least, affects enemies in their 
mutual relations, not citizens in theirs; for since these are socially bound together, it is 
just that they bear in common the losses which happen for the sake of society. It may 
however be established by the Civil Law, that a thing lost in war shall not give a citizen 
a right of recovery against the State; in order that each person may the more strenuously 
defend his own property." Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, Bk.3, c.20, §8, 3 Whewell's 
trans., 327. 
DThis is covered at length in fo~tnote #71 infra. 
A dictum has gone further in permitting the taking of property in time of war, with· 
out compensation. Parham v. The Justices, etc., of Decatur County, 9 Ga. 341, 348 (1851). 
Other dicta have gone beyond the statement of the text in requiring compensation. Mitchell 
Y. Harmony, 13 How.(U.S.) 115, 134, 14 L.Ed. 75, 84 (1851); Corbin v. Marsh. 2 Duv.(Ky.) 
193, 200 (1865) ; Russell v. The Mayor, etc., of New York, 2 Denio (N.Y.) 461, 484 
(1845); Mayor of New York v. Lord, 17 Wend.(N.Y.) 285, 292 (1837), aff'd, 18 Wend. 
(N.Y.) 126 (1837). 
Campbell's Case, 8 Ct.CI. 240 (1870), and Grant v. United States, 1 Ct.CI. 41 (1863), 
went beyond the text in granting compensation for property destroyed to prevent it from 
falling into the hands of the enemy. 
1 0Possibilities of attacks upon civilian populations under modem methods of warfare 
make this method of statement of the distinction preferable to a reference to the sphere of 
operations. Recognition of changed methods of warfare as a factor in determining what 
acts of the government may be considered within the scope of active military operations, 
is found in In re A Petition of Right, [1915] 3 K.B. 649, 653, 660, 664, 666, 84 L.J.K.B. 
1961, 113 L.T. 575, 59 S.J. 665, 31 T.L.R. 596, appeal ·withdrawn pursuant to agreement, 
[1916] W.N. 311, overruled on other grounds, Att'y-Gen'l v. De Keyser's Hotel, [1920] A.C. 
508, 89 L.J.Ch. 417, 122 L.T. 691, 64 S.J. 513, 36 T.L.R. 600; Lord Sumner in Att'y-Gen'l v. 
De Keyser's Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508, 565. 
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without compliance with the requirements of eminent domain procedure and 
without the payment of compensation in advance.U The chief ground upon 
which the distinction has been based has been the idea of choice. It has been 
felt that the government, in collecting supplies throughout the country, deliber· 
ately selects the individuals with whom it will deal, and should, therefore, com· 
pensate them, whereas it has been felt that what is done in the course of mili· 
tary operations is governed entirely by the fortunes of war, over which the 
government has no control,12 and for which it is not responsible.18 
With this background the Fifth Amendment was enacted, providing that 
private property shall not be t?ken for public use without just compensation-
property destroyed or damaged, as well as that appropriated, being considered 
"taken."14 In a Civil War Court of Claims case, shortly after the establishment 
of that court, it was said, after quoting Vattel: 
''The limitation imposed on the government of the United States 
in the exercise of its right of eminent domain by the fifth article of 
the amendments of the Constitution is a solenm recognition of this 
settled and fundamental law of States •••• "15 
In the course of American history various contentions have been made that 
the war powers of the government,16 when called into play, are so broad that 
all constitutional limitations which might operate as restrictions upon their 
exercise are for the time being suspendedP This doctrine, making the war 
powers of the government unlimited, was vigorously denied by the majority of 
the United States Supreme Court in the great case of Ex parte Milligan.18 That 
llJn emergencies arising ont of war conditions, the requirements of eminent domain 
procedure may he dispensed with in situations where compensation is nevertheless required. 
The obligation to make payment is broader than the procedural requirements. United 
States v. Russell, 13 Wall.(U.S.) 623, 20 L.Ed. 474 (1871), quoted in text, infra, at foot· 
notes ##30-31; see, also, the celebrated dictum in Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How.(U.S.) 
115, 134, 14 L.Ed. 75, 84 (1851). 
12This is not always strictly accurate, as the location of the sphere of military opera• 
tions may he determined by the authorities of the State in question and not by the enemy. 
As for responsibility for the existence of the war, giving rise to the necessity that operations 
he conducted somewhere; the only position which the governmental agencies of a country 
can take is that the entire responsibility is upon the enemy. 
130ther reasons for the distinction have been suggested, such as the impracticability 
of ascertaining damages due to military operations, ilie disastrous effect upon the public 
. treasury if such claims were paid, and that knowledge of such liability wonld discourage 
war activities on behalf of the governmenL Consult: Report of the House Committee on 
War-Claims, entitled: War-Claims and Claims of Aliens, by William Lawrence, March 26, 
1874, House Rep. #262, Forty-third Congress, 1st Session, pp. 46 et seq. 
14Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall.(U.S.) 166, 177, 20 L.Ed. 557, 560 (1871). 
15Grant v. United States, 1 Ct.Cl. 41, 44 (1863). In applying the distinction, this 
case seems open to critieiam. See footnote #9, supra. The distinction made by Vattcl ·was 
well expressed in Heflebower v. United States, 21 Ct.Cl. 228, 237 (1886). 
16The war powers of Congress are set forth in the Constitution in Art.I, §8, cl.l, 11, 
12, 13, 14, 15 & 16. They must, of course, be interpreted in the light of the "necessary 
and proper'' provision of clause 18 of the same section. The war powers of the executive 
department of the· government are found in Art.I, §9, par.2, and Art.II, §2, par.l. 
17Such contentions will be found collected, and answered, in Black, The Theory of the 
War Power under the Constitution, (1926) 60 Am.L.Rev. 31. He distinguishes, at page 37, 
the internal and external aspects of the war powers. 
184 Wall.(U.S.) 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866). This case, with auxiliary material, including 
the minutes of the proceedings of the militarY commission, has been printed as a volume in 
the series of American Trials. American Trials, Ex Parte: In the Matter of Lambdin P. 
Milligan, Samuel Klaus, editor. 
UNIVERSAL DRAFT: CONSTITUTIONALITY 365 
decision held that President Lincoln's proclamation of September 24, 1862/9 
authorizing military trial of civilians throughout the country, was unconstitu-
tional when applied to a case arising outside the theatre of military operations. 
Five members of the Court went farther and said that Congress, as well as the 
President, was forbidden to establish military commissions in areas where the 
civil courts were open. Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the majority, said, in 
a famous dictum: 
''The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and 
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its 
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. 
No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever in-
vented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be sus-
pended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a 
doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of 
necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the 
Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to 
preserve its existence, as has been happily proved by the result of the 
great effort to throw off its just authority."20 
Since the World War, denial of the doctrine of the inefficacy of constitu-
tional restrictions upon war powers has been reaffirmed, and given effect in 
actual decision, in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co.21 In that case the 
Court held unconstitutional a portion of. the war-time Lever Act22 (known also 
as the National Defense Act, the Food Control Act, and the Food Conservation 
Act) upon the ground that it attempted to create a criminal offense ·without fix. 
ing an ascertainable standard of guilt, and without adequately informing 
accused persons of the nature and cause of the accusation against them. In the 
opinion, Mr. Chief Justice White stated that the decisions of the Court indis-
putably established that the mere existence of a state of war could neither sus-
pend nor change the operation of the guaranties and limitations of the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments upon the power of Congress to create criminal offenses, 
and that, in testing the operation of those provisions of the Constitution, the 
existence or non-existence of a state of war had no relevancy.23 
It is, therefore, necessary to draw the line somewhere between the war 
powers and the various constitutional limitations. That the just compensation 
clause of the Fifth Amendment does not protect enemy property either in this 
country or abroad,24 and has no application to the taking of property of our 
citizens by an enemy, may be dismissed with the statement. Before the Con-
stitution went into effect the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that there was 
no obligation upon that Commonwealth to make compensation for a taking of 
property, made in the course of active military operations by the Pennsylvania 
Board of War in accordance with recommendations of Congress. Mr. Chief 
1013 Stat.at L. 730. 
204 Wall.(U.S.) 2, 120, 18 L.Ed. 281, 295 (1866). 
21255 U.S. 81, 41 Sup.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516 (1920). 
22Act of Oct. 22, 1919, c.80, §2, 41 Stat.at L. 297, re·enacting with slight changes, Act 
of Aug. 10, 1917, c.53, §4, 4{) Stat.at L. 276. 
23United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 88, 41 Sup.Ct. 298, 299, 65 L.Ed. 
516, 520 (1920). Mr. Justice Day did not participate in the decision. Mr. Justice Pitney 
and Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred in a special opinion which avoided passing upon the 
constitutional question. 
24Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch(U.S.) 110 (1814). 
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Justice McKean said that Congress was vested with the powers of peace and 
war, to which this action was a natural and necessary incident: 
"The transaction, it must he remembered, happened flagrante 
bello; and many things are lawful in that season, which would not he 
permitted in a time of peace .•.. It is a rule ... that it is better to 
suffer a private mischief, than a public inconvenience; and the rights 
of necessity, form a part of our law."25 
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Samuel Chase of the United States Supreme 
Court early indicated a belief that the just compensation clause did apply to 
some takings of private property in time of war for war purposes. This was 
in Ware v. Hylton, decided in 1796.26 The suit was brought by a British sub· 
ject against citizens of Virginia to collect a debt which the defendants previ· 
ously had paid into the treasury of the Commonwealth of Virginia in 1780, 
pursuant to an act of the legislature confiscating all debts of its citizens to 
British subjects. The treaty of peace of 1783, which terminated the Revolution· 
ary War, provided that creditors on either side should not meet with any 
impediments to the full recovery of all debts.21 It was held that the treaty 
superseded the act o~ the Virginia legislature, and that the defendants must 
again pay the debt to the plaintiff. The facts of the case occurred too early to 
he subject to the Fifth Amendment, but Mr. Justice Chase said that, while Con· 
gress had the power to sacrifice the rights and interests of private citizens to 
secure the safety or prosperity of the public, yet the immutable prineiples of 
justice, the public faith of the States and the rights of the debtors, all combined 
to prove that debtors who had been injured by the treaty for the benefit of the 
public ought to receive ample compensation, and that " .•• this principle is 
recognized by the Constitution, which declares, 'that private property shall not 
be taken for public use without just compensation.' " 2s 
In the famous case of Mitchell v. Harmony/9 in the same Court, army 
officers, while in Mexico in the course of a campaign against that country, had 
impressed the property of a camp-following trader. It was held that, as neither 
the American forces nor the property of the plaintiff were in immediate danger 
at the time of the seizure, the taking was an unjustifiable trespass on the part 
of the officers. It was stated that there were, without doubt, occasions when a 
military officer might impress property for the public service without being 
liable as a trespasser, and yet the government would be bound to make full 
compensation to the owner. The basis of the obligation was not discussed. 
In only one decision has the United States Supreme Court passed squarely 
upon the question whether the compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment 
applies to the present problem. The case is United States v. Russell,80 deeided 
shortly after the Civil War. During that struggle several steamships owned by 
the plaintiff, which were being used outside the area of active military opera· 
25Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 Dall.(Pa.) 357, 362 (1788). 
2a3 Dall.(U.S.) 199, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796). 
27Treaty of Sept. 3, 1783, Art.IV, 8 Stat.at L. 80, 82, 1 Malloy'!! Treaties, 586, 588. 
28Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall.(U.S.) 199, 245, 1 L.Ed. 568, 588 (1796). The Justices 
delivered separate opinions. 
2913 How.(U.S.) 115, 14 L.Ed. 75 (1851). 
so13 Wall. (U.S.) 623, 20 L.Ed. 474 (1871). 
UNIVERSAL DRAFT: CONSTITUTIONALITY 367 
tions, were impressed and used as transports. There was no express contract, 
but the Court held that the constitutional obligation to make just compensation 
raised an implied contract on the part of the government. Because of the out-
standing importance of the decision in any future consideration of the problem, 
the unanimous opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr. Justice Clifford, is 
quoted from at some length: 
"Private property, the Constitution provides, shall not be taken 
for public use ·without just compensation, and it is clear that there are 
few safeguards ordained in the fundamental law against oppression 
and the exercise of arbitrary power of more ancient origin or of 
greater value to the citizen, as the provision for compensation, except 
in certain extreme cases, is a condition precedent annexed to the right 
of the government to deprive the owner of his property without his 
consent. ••. :&..1:raordinary and unforeseen occasions arise, however, 
beyond all doubt, in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of 
immediate and impending public danger, in which private property 
may be impressed into the public service, or may he seized or appro-
priated to the public use, or may even he destroyed without the con-
sent of the owner. Unquestionably, such extreme cases may arise, as 
where the property taken is imperatively necessary in time of war to 
construct defences for the preservation of a military post at the 
moment of an impending attack by the enemy, or for food or medicine 
for a sick and famishing army utterly destitute and without other 
means of such supplies, or to transport troops, munitions of war, or 
clothing to reinforce or supply an army in a distant field, where the 
necessity for such reinforcement or supplies is extreme and impera-
tive, to enable those in command of the post to maintain their position 
or to repel an impending attack, provided it appears that other means 
of transportation could not he obtained, and that the transports im-
pressed for the purpose were imperatively required for such imme-
diate use. Where such an eJ..1:raordinary and unforeseen emergency 
occurs in the public service in time of war no doubt is entertained that 
the power of the government is ample to supply for the moment the 
public wants in that way to the extent of the immediate public 
exigency, but the public danger must he immediate, imminent, and 
impending, and the emergency in the public service must he extreme 
and imperative, and such as will not admit of delay or a resort to any 
other source of supply; and the circumstances must he such as impera-
tively require the exercise of that extreme power in respect to the 
particular property so impressed, appropriated, or destroyed. Exig-
encies of the kind do arise in time of war or impending public danger, 
but it is the emergency, as was said by a great magistrate, that gives 
the right, and it is clear that the emergency must he shown to exist 
before the taking can he justified. Such a justification may he shown, 
and when shown the rule is well settled that the officer taking private 
property for such a purpose, if the emergency is fully proved, is not a 
trespasser, and that the government is bound to make full compensa-
tion to the owner .... 
"Such a taking of private property by the government, when the 
emergency of the public service in time of war or impending public 
danger is too urgent to admit of delay, is everywhere regarded as justi-
fied, if the necessity for the use of the property is imperative and 
immediate, and the danger, as heretofore described, is impending; and 
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it is equally clear that the taking of such property under such cir-
cumstances creates an obligation on the part of the government to 
reimburse the owner to the full value of the service. Private rights, 
under such extreme and imperious circumstances, must give way for 
the time to the public good, but the government must make full resti-
tution for the sacrifice."81 
A similar decision was made by the Confederate Supreme Court of Georgia 
under the corresponding provision of the Constitution of the Confederate 
, States, 82 holding unconstitutional an act of the Confederate Congress which 
provided for the impressment of property for-war purposes, and that, in cer· 
tain cases, the compensation should be in accordance with a schedule of prices, 
to be fixed from time to time by commissioners appointed for each state-no 
schedule to operate for longer than sixty days without new action by the com· 
missioners.83 It was pointed out that market values cannot be ascertained in 
advance, and that, unless the government paid the prices which citizen con· 
sumers would pay, the result would be a levy upon one portion of the people 
from which others would eseape. 
United States v. RU$sell34 is not as decisive of the question as it would 
seem to be, since it must be considered in connection with a dictum of the same 
court sixteen years later, suggesting that possibly the obligation of the govern· 
ment to make compensation in such cases exists, not because of any provision 
of the Constitution, but because of a general principle of law applied by the 
courts. If this is the correct position it is obvious that Congress can terminate 
the obligation at any time. Such a suggestion contemplates that the just com-
pensation clause of the Fifth Amendment was not framed with a view to the 
historic distinction between damage in the course of active military operations 
and other damage done by the state either in times of peace or during a war. 
A holding such as that in United States v. RU$sell,3s on the other hand, assumes 
that Vattel's distinction has been crystallized into the Fifth Amendment. 
The dictum referred to appears in the case of United States v. Pacific Rail-
road, 36 dealing with claims arising out of the destruction and rebuilding of 
31United States v. Russell, 13 Wall.(U.S.) 623, 20 L.Ed. 474 (1871). The decision 
upheld the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, notwithstanding the provision of the Act of 
July 4, 1864, c.240, §1, 13 Stat.at L. 381, that the jurisdiction of that court should not 
extend to any claim for the appropriation of property by the military forces engaged in the 
suppression of the Rebellion. The court held, perhaps questionably, that the facts did not 
show an "appropriation," as the military officers did not intend to appropriate the steam· 
boats to the United States, nor even their services, but only to compel the masters and 
crews,, with the steamers, to perform the services needed, it being understood on both sides 
that the United States would pay a reasonable compensation. The validity of the implied 
agreement to pay was found in the constitutional provision, and the resulting obligation 
came within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims as one based on implied contract. 
32Cunningham v. Campbell, 33 Ga. 625 (Confederate, 1863), applying Const. of the 
Confederate States of America, Art.I, §9, par.16. To the same effect: Cox & Hill v. Cum-
mings, 33 Ga. 549 (Confederate, 1863). 
3SThe case is weakened by the faet that it was conceded by the Government (33 Ga. 
625, 630) that provision for compensation at some time was necessary in order to comply 
with the Constitution. It was argued that, nevertheless, the statute impressing the property 
did not need to provide compensation, as it could be supplied by subsequent legislation. 
This contention was denied and the plaintiff restored to possession of his property. 
3413 Wall.(U.S.) 623, 20 L.Ed. 474 (1871). 
3513 Wall.(U.S.) 623, 20 L.Ed. 474 (1871). 
ao120 U.S. 2'!:1, 7 Sup.Ct. 490, 30 L.Ed. 634 (1887). 
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railroad bridges in the course of active military operations in the State of 
Missouri during the Civil War. It was held that the railroad company was not 
entitled to compensation for the destruction of its bridges, and that the gov-
ernment was not entitled to charge against the company the costs of reconstruc-
tion of bridges which had been rebuilt by the army as an incident of military 
operations. In the course of the opinion, Mr. Justice Field said: 
"In what we have said as to the exemption of Government from 
liability for private property injured or destroyed during war, by the 
operations of armies in the field, or by measures necessary for their 
safety and efficiency, we do not mean to include claims where property 
of loyal citizens is taken for the service of our armies, such as vessels, 
steamboats, and the like, for the transport of troops and munitions of 
war; or buildings to be used as storehouses and places of deposit of 
war material, or to house soldiers or take care of the sick, or claims 
for supplies seized and appropriated. In such cases, it has been the 
practice of the Government to make compensation for the property 
taken. Its obligation to do so is supposed to rest upon the general 
principle of justice that compensation should be made where private 
property is taken for public use, although the seizure and appropria-
tion of private property under such circumstances by the military 
authorities may not be within the terms of the constitutional 
clause. • . ."37 
The dictum has not developed into decision. Other cases have indicated 
a belief in the applicability of the just compensation clause to war require· 
ments.38 Such a statement by Mr. Justice Miller appears in a Civil War case.39 
Mr. Justice Butler, Mr. Justice Sutherland and Mr. Justice McReynolds have so 
expressed themselves in delivering opinions of the~ court dealing with war-time 
requisitions.40 Mr. Justice Butler, in a passage quoted with approval by Mr. 
37120 U.S. 227, 239, 7 Sup.Ct. 490, 495, 30 L.Ed. 634, 638 (1887). 
38In addition to cases cited elsewhere, consult: Mason v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 59, 
70 (1878); Clark v. Mitchell, 64 Mo. 564, 572 (1877), rev'd on other grounds, llO U.S. 633, 
4 Sup.Ct. 170 and 312, 28 L.Ed. 279 (1884); see United States v. New River Collieries Co., 
276 Fed. 690 (C.C.A. 3rd Cir. 1921), afj'd, 262 U.S. 341, 43 Sup.Ct. 565, 67 L.Ed. 1014 
(1923); Tyson v. Rogers, 33 Ga. 473 (Confederate, 1863); Ex parte Gardner, 84 Kan. 264, 
113 Pac. 1054. (19ll); Sellards v. Zornes, 5 Bush.(Ky.) 90 (1869); Lajoie v. Milliken, 242 
Mass. 508, 136 N.E. 419 (1922); American Print Works v. Lawrence, 3 Zab.(23 N.J.L.) 
590 {1851); semble: Russell v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 2 Denio(N.Y.) 461, 484, 4S7 
{1845); Mayor of New York v. Lord, 17 Wend.(N.Y.) 285 (1837), afj'd, 18 Wend.(N.Y.) 
126 (1837). 
SDUnited States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220, 1 Sup.Ct. 240, 260, 27 L.Ed. 171, 181 (1882). 
40Mr. Justice Butler, in Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304, 
306, 43 Sup.Ct. 354, 355, 356, 67 L.Ed. 664, 669, (1923); Mr. Justice Sutherland, in 
Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.;i. 502, 508, 43 Sup.Ct. 437, 67 L.Ed. 
773, 775 (1923); Mr. Justice McReynolds, in Houston Coal Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 
361, 365, 43 Sup.Ct. 612, 67 L.Ed. 1028, 1029 (1923), and Davis v. Newton Coal Co., 
267 U.S. 292, 301, 45 Sup.Ct. 305, 306, 69 L.Ed. 617, 620 (1925). Similar statements by 
Mr. Justice Butler appear in Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 123, 44 
Sup.Ct. 471, 474, 68 L.Ed. 934, 941 (1924)-a case involving an appropriation of contract 
rights under the Emergency Shipping Act. Act of June 15, 1917, c.29, 40 Stat.at L. 182, 
and in another Lever Act case. United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 
344, 43 Sup.Ct. 565, 566, 67 L.Ed. 1014, 1017 (1923). 
The w·ar did not legally end until July 2, 1921, on which date President Harding 
signed a Joint Resolution of Congress declaring the war to be at an end. Joint Res. of 
July 2, 1921, c.40, 42 Stat.at L. 105; consult: Zimmerman v. Hicks, 7 Fed.(2d) 443 (C.C.A. 
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Justice McReynolds,41 states that the ascertainment of war-time compensation is 
a judicial function, which cannot he exercised by any other department of the 
government.42 This is because the right to compensation is based upon the 
Constitution.48 Judges of the Court of Claims have expressed the view that 
the compensation clause is applicable.44 
In delivering the opinion upholding the validity of the War-Time Prohi-
bition Act,45 Mr. Justice Brandeis was careful to point out that this portion of 
the Fifth Amendment had not he~n violated. He said: 
"The war power of the United States, like its other powers and 
like the police power of the States, is subject to applicable constitu-
tional limitations • . . [citing Ex parte Milligan and other cases] ; hut 
the Fifth Amendment imposes in this respect no greater limitation 
upon the national power than does the Fourteenth Amendment upon 
state power."46 
Matthew Ailily Co. v. Uniteil States/1 following the World War, involved 
the validity of convictions for violation of a Presidential order-made under 
the previously mentioned Lever, or Food Control, Act48-fixing prices of coal 
on all sales throughout the country. The convictions were reversed by the 
United States Supreme Court upon the ground that the order was not retro-
active, and did not apply to coal purchased before its issuance. In delivering 
the opinion, Mr. Justice McReynolds thought it a grave constitutional question, 
to he avoided if possible through the application of any canons of reasonable 
construction, whether Congress had the power to provide for the fixing of prices 
at which people then owning coal might sell it thereafter, without providing 
compensation for losses.49 This would, of course, he going farther than a 
2nd Cir. 1925), af}'d, Zimmerman v. Sutherland, 273 U.S. 780, 47 Sup.Ct. 447, 71 L.Ed. 
1340 (1926) (memorandum opinion) ; Black, The Termination of Hostilities, (1928) 62 
Am.L.Rev. 248, 251. 
41Davis v. Newton Coal Co., 267 U.S. 292, 301, 45 Sup.Ct. 305, 306, 69 L.Ed. 617, 
620 (1925). 
42United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344, 43 Sup.Ct. 565, 567, 
67 L.Ed. 1014, ).017 (1923). 
431\fonongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 327, 13 Sup.Ct. 622, 
626, 37 L.Ed. 463, 468 (1893). 
44Mr. Judge Hay, in Hudson Navigation Co. v. United States, 57 Ct.CI. 411, 415 
(1922) ; Mr. Chief Justice Campbell, in Gulf Refining Co. v. United States, 58 Ct.Cl. 559, 
575 (1923). Both these cases related to takings for war purposes during the World War. 
Mr. Judge Howry spoke likewise in a case arising out of the Philippine Insurrection. 
Philippine Sugar Estates Dev. Co. v. United States, 40 Ct.CI. 33, 35 (1904). 
45Act of Nov. 21, 1918, c.212, 40 Stat.at L. 1045, 1046. 
46Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156, 40 Sup.Ct. 106, 108, 64 
L.Ed. 194, 199 (1919). Mr. Justice Brandeis made a similar distinction in delivering the 
opinion upholding the Volstead Act, Act of Oct. 28, 1919, c.85, 41 Stat.at L. 305, U.S.C. 
title 27, which, as the case stood, upon motion to dismiss, was taken to prohibit non-intoxi-
cating liquor. Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered a dissenting opinion, in which two otlter 
justices (Day and Van Devanter, JJ.) concurred, in which he relied in part on the com• 
pensation clause. Jacob Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 303, 305, 310, 40 Sup.Ct. 141, 151, 
153, 64 L.Ed. 260, 276, 277, 279 (1920). 
47264 U.S. 239, 44 Sup.Ct. 300, 68 L.E. 658 (1924), rev'g Ford v. United States, 281 
Fed. 298 (C.C.A. 6th Cir. 1922). 
4BAct of Aug. 10, 1917, c.53, 40 Stat.at L. 276; see, supra, footnote #22. 
49Matthew Addy Co. v. United States, ~64 U.S. 239, 245, 44 Sup.Ct. 300, 302, 68 L.Ed. 
658, 661 (1924). In the decision of the Circnit Court of Appeals, the Presidential order, 
prohibiting more than 15 cents per ton profit, was interpreted to be retroactive, and yet 
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universal draft, as it would relate to property in use by the civilian population 
and never intended for war purposes. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in dealing with a war-time requisition 
of coal, after pointing out that the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment was applicable, said: 
"Just compensation must be made for private property taken for 
war purposes. This is not only well settled but based on sound 
morals."60 -.. 
In a lengthy opinion, holding invalid certain regulations of the Wool Divi-
sion of the War Industries Board, Mr. Circuit Judge Rose, of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, said: 
"The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the 
Navy, doubtless had the constitutional power in war time, in cases of 
immediate and pressing exigency, to appropriate private property to 
public uses; the government being hound to make just compensation 
therefor •.•• The constitutional requirement that the government must 
pay just compensation for what it takes is one which war does not 
suspend. "51 
held to he within the war powers. Ford v. United States, 281 Fed. 298, 303 ( C.C.A. 6th 
Cir. 1922). 
In overruling demurrers to indictments for excessive prices, a District Judge refused 
to consider an argument based upon the Fifth Amendment, upon the ground that any 
decision upon a constitutional question of such far-reaching importance should come from 
the court of last resort. United States v. Spokane Dry Goods Co., 264 Fed. 209, 211 (D.C. 
Wash. 1920). 
001\fr. Justice Kephart, in Geo. B. Newton Coal Co. v. Davis, 281 Pa. 74, 85, 126 Atl. 
192, 196 (1924), af]'d, Davis v. Newton Coal Co., 267 U.S. 292, 45 Sup.Ct. 305, 69 L.Ed. 
617 (1925). 
Similar statements by llfr. Justice Kephart appear in Highland v. Russell Car & Snow 
Plow Co., 288 Pa. 230, 234, 2-38, 135 Atl. 759, 761, 762 (1927). This was a suit hetween 
private parties where the buyer of coal had refused to pay more than the price fixed by the 
Presidential order under §25 of the Lever Act. The suit was dismissed. The judgment 
was affirmed in the United States Supreme Court, upon the ground, as stated by Mr. Justice 
Butler, that the Presidential order had deprived the plaintiff "only of the right or ·oppor-
tunity hy negotiation to obtain more than his coal was worth," and that such deprivation 
was within the war powers, notwithstanding the applicable constitutional limitations. It 
was pointed out also that it did not appear that the plaintiff would have been entitled to 
more if his coal had been requisitioned. Highland v. Russell Car & Snowplow Co., 279 
U.S. 253, 262, 49 Sup.Ct. 314, 317, 73 L.Ed. 688, 692 (1929). 
This case departs from market value as the test of legal value, hut wherever compensa-
tion for private property is required an inadequate price is considered a taking pro tanto. 
In fixing public utility rates, a return of 6.26 per cent. has been held "clearly inadequate." 
United Rys. & Elec. Co. of Baltimore v. West, 280 U.S .••. , 50 Sup. Ct. 123, 126, 74 L.Ed. 
(Adv.Ops.) 148, 152 (1930). 
ulUnited States v. McFarland, 15 Fed.(2d) 823, 826 (C.C.A. 4th Cir. 1926), certiorari 
granted, 273 U.S. 688, 47 Sup.Ct. 449, 71 L.Ed. 841 (1927) , revoked, 275 U.S. 485, 48 
Sup.Ct. 27, 72 L.Ed. 386 (1927). 
The suit was brought to recover excess profits on wool during the year 1919. The 
regulations had purported to effect a forfeiture of the excess profits. This was held to be 
a penalty, and beyond the powers of the Board. A statement, similar to the one quoted in 
the text, appears in a case relating to a war-time requisition of eoal. Knapp, Circuit Judge, 
in Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Davis, 281 Fed. 385, 387, 25 AL.R. 1173, 1175 (C.C.A. 4th 
Cir. 1922). 1\fr. Circuit Judge Waddill dissented upon another ground. 
In the certiorari proceedings in United States v. McFarland, the government conceded 
that the wool regulations were invalid. See United States v. Smith, 32 Fed. (2d) 901 (D.C. 
Mass. 1929). 
372 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW 
·• Mr. Judge Mayer, theu ou the District beuoh, expressed himself clearly on 
the point: 
''The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
provides that private property shall not be taken for public use "IYith-
out just compensation. Article 1, §8, cl. 11, of the Constitution of the 
United States confers upon the Congress power to declare war. This 
war power, however, does not abrogate the constitutional guaranty 
contained in the Fifth Amendment, as has been recently reiterated by 
the Supreme Court in the Lever Act oases .... 
"To carry out the purpose of the [Lever] act, the President could 
make regulations in the way, inter alia, of fixing prices in ordinary 
trading or commercial transactions; but when the United States itself 
took foods--i.e., property-it was bound to award just compensation, 
and what is just compensation under the Constitution is determined by 
the same legal principles in war as in peace .... 
''To award only cost plus 5 per cent. profit, as contended by the 
government, would not be just compensation, constitutionally con-
sidered. In all litigations like this, principle must never be departed 
from. In the long run, the Constitution remains a safe guide, although 
worthy sentimental considerations, at times, offer temptations to go 
astray."52 
Perhaps the best, certainly the most famous, treatment of the problem 
.appears in the celebrated Lawrence Committee Report of the House Committee 
on War-Claims, on ''War-Claims and Claims of Aliens," by William Lawrence, 
March 26, 1874.53 The report traces the history of the distinction between a 
taking of property in the course- of active military operations and a taking for 
war purposes not of that character, shows that the distinction antedates the 
Constitution, and expresses the opinion that it bas been embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment. Secretary of War William W. Belknap stated that it was the 
practice of the.War Department to pay Civil War claims of the character under 
consideration, without express statutory authority, upon the theory of implied 
contract under the Fifth Amendment.54 The emancipation of the slaves might 
well have furnished a conclusive decision upon the question, but failed to do 
so.55 A committee report after the War of 1812 held that a claim arising out 
of the use of property was not covered by the Fifth Amendment, for the reason 
5 2NatiOJ1al City Bank v. United States, 275 Fed. 855, 859-861 (D.C. N.Y. 1921), aff'cl 
on grounds not involving the merits, 281 Fed. 754 (C.C.A. 2nd Cir. 1922), appeal dismissed 
hy appellant, 263 U.S. 726, 44 Sup.Ct. 32, 68 L.Ed. 527 (1922). The case involved coffee 
commandeered ·by the navy on Nov. 21, 1918. The suit was brought under §10 of the Lever 
Act to recover the "just compensation" there provided for. The plaintiff was awarded tl1e 
market value instead of the cost plus five per cent. provided for by Presidential order. The 
question being judicial, because constitutional, it was held that only the court could fix 
the compensation. 
G3House Rep. #262, Forty·third Congress, 1st Session, 11, 36-41, 49, 50. 
G4Letter to William Lawrence, Chairman of the Committee on War·Claims of the 
House· of Representatives, Feb. 24, 1874, attached as Exhibit A, to Report of Committee on 
War.Ciainls, House Rep. #262, Forty·third Congress, 1st Session. 
55This was primarily because of the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, pro· 
hihiting slavery, and the fourth section of the Fourteenth Amendment, providing that neither 
the United States nor any State should pay any claim for the loss or emancipation of any 
slave. A Kentucky case held unconstitutional, upon the ground of the just compensation 
clause, an act of Congress (Joint Res. of March 3, 1865, 13 Stat.at L. 571) granting freedom 
to the wives and children of slaves who enlisted as soldiers. "It would he inexplicably 
strange and incousistent to admit, as all do, that Congress can not, in time of peace, take 
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that the Amendment " •.• seems to imply a voluntary act on the part of the 
Government, which in the present case could hardly he alleged."fi6 In inter-
national law, a distinction between a taking because of military necessity and a 
taking from deliberate choice is generally recognized in the adjustment hetwee;n 
nations of claims arising out of injuries to property of individuals.~7 
In an address the present Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court 
expressed the distinction thus: 
" ... with respect to the citizen's rights of property, a distinction may 
he taken between the unavoidable deprivations which take place 
where the conflict rages, and those takings, although for military pur-
poses, which are deliberate appropriations for which compensation 
must he made."56 
Mr. District Judge Henry A.M. Smith, in stating his reasons for referring 
to a jury the question of the amount of compensation to he paid for the taking 
of land during the war, after referring to the just compensation clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, said: 
"Does the fact of the mere existence of a state of war between two 
countries abrogate all civil laws existing in either? It has never been 
so held. The mere statement that there is a condition of war loses 
entire sight of the circumstances under which the urgency of war may 
exist. Many matters are permissible on the field of battle, or in the 
face of the enemy, or in the territory directly subject to the incursions · 
of warfare, which are not permissible in the country entirely removed 
from it, where the population is orderly and is purstimg its usual 
avocations. In the course of an armed conflict, it may he entirely 
proper that the troops of the country, defending the country, take 
refuge from the fire of the enemy in the private house of a citizen of 
· the country, which may lead to its destruction; and in such cases the 
government would not he liable to condenmation, as that is an incident 
to the struggle itself. 
"That would not mean, however, that 1,000 miles from the scene 
of conflict, in the midst of civil order and the enforcement of civil 
laws, the government could summarily take and destroy the house of 
a citizen without awarding him just compensation for the taking."59 
private property for public use without just compensation, and nevertheless, to claim, as 
some seem to do, the power to take it without any compensation in time of war, when all 
such property is in most danger of spoilation, and in most need of the protection of this 
boasted palladium." Corbin v. :Marsh, 2 Duv.(63 Ky.) 193, 196 (1865). To the same 
effect: Hughes v. Todd, 2 Duv.(63 Ky.) 188 (1865). Mr. Judge Williams dissented in both 
cases, upon the ground that the Fifth Amendment was not a limitation upon the war powers. 
2 Duv.(63 Ky.) 202, 226. 
5GReport of Committee on Claims of House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 1820, American 
State Papers, Claims, Class IX, p. 753. 
fi7Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 262. 
5SCharles E. Hughes, War Powers under the Constitution, (1917) 42 Rep. A.B.A. 232, 
246, (1917) 2 Marq.L.Rev. 3, 16, (1917) 85 Cent.L.J. 206, 213, 2 Mass.L.Q. 575, 62 Ohio 
L.Bull. 437, 17 Brief of Phi Delta Phi, 179. 
To the same effect: Black, The Theory of the War Power under the Constitution, 
(1926) 60 Am.L.Rev. 31; Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 262; 
Cohen, Concerning the Power of the United States in War Time as to Taking Property, 
(1919) 53 Am.L.Rev. 87, 97 and 177, 190; King, The Constitutional Foundation of War 
Claims for Property, (1881) 20 Am.L.Reg. [2nd Ser.] 226, 229-239; 3 Willoughby, Con-
stitutional Law, 2nd ed., 1570. 
59Filbin Corp. v. United States, 266 Fed. 911, 916-917 (D.C. S.C. 1920); see, also, 
265 Fed. 354 (D.C. S.C. 1920). 
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It seems not too much to. say that it has been the generally accepted view 
that- the just compensation clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to takings of 
property in time of war apart from active military operations. The question 
has not, however, received the precise analysis which would he given it if a 
nation-wide draft of material resources were to he attempted. To return to the 
dictum casting doubt upon the validity of the view expressed,00 Mr. Justice 
Field does not state that it is now the law that compensation need not he made 
rmder such eircumstances. The extent of his suggestion is only that possibly 
the obligation to make compensation is outside the scope of the constitutional 
provision. If this is true, it becomes merely a principle of justice applied by 
the courts and customarily provided for in statutes, and is subject to repeal by 
act of Congress. 
It is pertinent to inquire, therefore, whether it has been a principle of the 
common law that there is an obligation to make such compensation. If such a 
common law principle has existed, the actual decision in United States v, 
Russell61 can he supported upon that ground, and the holding that the Con-
stitution requires compensation is the more readily open to attack. On the 
other hand, if there has been no such principle at common law, the decision 
upon the facts in United States v. Russell62 can he supported only upon the 
constitutional ground, and any later decision holding the Constitution inappli-
cable would he clearly a direct reversal of the result there reached. 
"The gro1vth of constitutional liberties has largely consisted in the reduc-
tion of the discr~onary power of the executive, and in the extension of Parlia-
mentary· protection in favor of the subject, .•• "63 and historical research carried 
sufficiently far would reach a period when all subjects and all their possessions 
were subject to the arbitrary power of the King. Under such circumstances 
there would, of course, he no compensation to the subject for something taken 
from him. The available historical materials, however, do not show any 
instance where the property of a private citizen has been taken for war pur-
poses without compensation, O<l except in the special case of saltpetre in the 
ground, to he used for the manufacture of gunpowder,6 G and that only prior 
to 1660.66 
OOQuoted in full in text, supra, at footnote #37. The concluding portion is as fol-
lows: "In such cases, it has been the practice of the Government to make compensation 
for the _property taken. Its obligation to do so is supposed to rest upon the generlil prin-
ciple of justice.that compensation should be made where private property is taken for pub· 
lie use, although the seizure and appropriation of private property under sueh circumstances 
by the military authorities may not he within the terms of the constitutional clause •••• " 
:Mr. Justice Field, in United States v. Pacific R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 239, 7 Sup.Ct. 490, 496, 
30 L.Ed. 634, 638 (1887). 
6113 Wall.(U.S.) 623, 20 L.Ed. 474 (1871). 
6213 Wall. (U.S.) 623, 20 L.Ed. 474 (1871). 
63Lord Parmoor, in Att'y-Gen'l v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508, 568, 89 
LJ.Ch. 417, 122 L.T.Rep. 691, 64 S.J. 513, 36 T.L.R. 600. 
· ML. Scott and A. Hildesley, The Case of Requisition, 46. See, also, footnote #71, 
infra. 
65The Case of Saltpetre, 12 Co.Rep. 12, 77 Eng.Rep. 1294 (1696). 
66Termiuated by 12 Car.II, c.24, §11: Swinfen Eady, in In re De Keyser's Hotel, 
[1919] 2 Ch. 197, 219, 88 L.J.Ch. 415, 120 L.T.Rep. 396, 63 S.J. 445, 35 T.L.R. 418; Lord 
Parmoor, in Att'y-Gen'l v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508, 571, 89 L.J.Ch. 417, 
122 L.T.Rep. 691, 64 S.J. 513, 36 T.L.R. 600; L. Scott and A. Hildesley, The Case of 
Requisition, 58, 138. See footnote #71, infra. 
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The records also do not show that it has ever been decided definitely hy 
the courts of England either that there is or that there is not a legal obligation 
upon the Crown to compensate a citizen for property taken for war purposes. 
It does not appear that prior to the World War the question was presented to 
the courts, either hy the Crown or hy a citizen, and during or following that 
war it was not decided. Whether the absence of adjudication has been" ..• he-
cause no subject ever had the temerity to put forward such a contention, or ••. 
because the Crown never gave _him occasion to do so, is a matter which remains 
unknown."67 What the records do show is this: that throughout the historical 
period there has been the unbroken practice, with the single exception men-
tioned, of making compensation. In nearly all cases this has been provided for 
by Act of Parliament. It is difficult to overestimate the importance, from the 
present standpoint, of such a continuous custom extending over a period of 
hundreds of years. " •.. The foundations of constitutional law lie deeply im-
bedded in ground which is in the joint occupation of historians and lawyers,"68 
and the custom of one generation becomes the natural and the juristic law of 
the next. Because of the universal historical practice of making compensation, 
Sir John Simon has declared that it is the "true constitutional view" in England 
that prerogative powers69 of the Crown in time of war are not without limit, 
and that' when the citizen's property is taken for war purposes he must he 
given compensation. 70 
The available historical materials having any hearing upon the proposition 
under discussion, other than those showing the practice of payment, are meager, 
hut the long continued custom, extending hack long prior to the American 
Revolution, seems to justify the conclusion that it has been a principle of the 
common law that compensation must he made.71 All this, of course, has no 
reference to acts in active military operations. 
67Lord Sumner, in Att'y-Gen'l v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508, 563, 89 
LJ.Ch. 417, 122 L.T.Rep. 691, 64 S.J. 513, 36 T.L.R. 600. 
6SSir John Simon, Introduction to L. Scott and A. Hildesley, The Case of Requisition, 
xxiv. 
69Prerogative powers may be defined as those powers which historical development has 
failed to remove from the Crown. Like other powers of the Crown they are today exercised 
upon the responsibility of His Majesty's Prime Minister. 
76Sir John Simon, Introduction to L. Scott and A. Hildesley, The Case of Requisition, 
xvii; to same effect: L. Scott and A. Hildesley, The Case of Requisition, 72, 136; T. Baty 
and J. H. Morgan, War: Its Conduct and Legal Results, 9 et seq.; see, also, footnote #71, 
infra. 
710n this topic, the best source of material available in this country is an excellent 
work by L. Scott and A. Hildesley, The Case of Requisition (Oxford, 1920. pp. mv, 304). 
This volume consists of a discussion of the problems presented in the case of Att'y-Gen'l v. 
De Keyser's Royal Hotel, which will be discussed subsequently in this footnote. In appen-
dices are set forth records which were selected as the result of research at the Record 
Office and presented to the courts upon the various appeals of that case. The authors 
point out (pp. 15, 24, & 74-76) that resort was had to Parliament for statutes to authorize 
the taking of property during wars at times of great national peril, when it would seem 
certain that a prerogative power would have been used if it had been thought to exist. 
They show the universal practice to have been to make compensation (pp. 10-78 passim, 
and 136-157 passim), and deny the exception in regard to saltpetre (pp. 54 & 58) (also 
denying that saltpetre was taken without payment: Swinfen Eady, M.R., in In re De Keyser's 
Hotel, [1919] 2 Ch. 197, 218, 88 L.J.Ch. 415, 120 L.T.Rep. 396, 63 S.J. 445, 35 T.L.R. 
418 [1919]). 
The Case of Saltpetre, 12 Co.Rep. 12, 77 Eng.Rep. 1294 (1606), like other cases in 
Coke's Reports, consists of resolutions of the justices upon questions submitted to them. 
In this case, they advise the King in regard to exercise of the prerogative right to "pur· 
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This conclusion means that an American court confronted with the 
necessity of passiitg upon the constitutionality of a universal draft law, and 
veyance" of saltpetre. "Purveyance" is a prior right of the Crown to secure supplies, gen· 
erally for the provisioningof the King's household, and usually upon payment of compensn· 
tion. With t!te increasing use of gunpowder in warfare, the securing of saltpetre had 
become an object of special concern, and the King had been given n special right to go 
upon the land of his subjects to take it. While the available records do not contain any 
express statement in regard to compensation for saltpetre, it seems that the only payment 
to be made was for the disturbance to the possession of the surface. In any event, pur· 
veyances were abolished in 1660 (see footnote #66, supra), and were never revived for 
this purpose. In a dictum in his dissenting opinion in Russell v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 
2 Denio(N.Y.) 461, 486 (1845), Senator Hard cites the Saltpetre case ns an illustration of 
the ahuse in England of admitted rights conferred by necessity, and the habit of confusing 
those rights with the doctrines of prerogative, which, he says, probahly led to the provision 
in the Constitution of the United ~tntes forbidding the taking of private property for public 
use without compensation. 
Incorporated Society v. Queen, [1900] 1 I.R. 465 (1900), involved the question of 
payment of compensation for permanent injury to land taken during the war with Napoleon 
in 1803 and surrendered by the government in 1896. Scott & Hildesley (p. 29 note) criti· 
cize the case upon the ground that it decided that, under the act of Parliament under which 
the original inquisition proceedings for condemnation were held, there was no obligation 
upon the government to make compensation for such injury. If true, this would amount to 
a pro tanto taking of the land without compensation. In this, however, tlte effect of the 
decision has been misapprehended. The majority cf the court felt that compensation for 
the injury could have been secured in the original inquisition, and that therefore the award 
then made was res adjudicata upon the point. Incorporated Society v. Queen, [1900] 1 I.R. 
465, 475, 488 & 494 (1900). Lord FitzGibbon, who disagreed upon the question of res 
adjudicata, dissf!nted on the ground that the landowner should still be able to recover. 
The decision is, therefore, not against the right to compensation. 
Throughout history, ships especially have been subject to requisition, because of their 
ready ndnptahility to military purposes, and because of the unique value to them of naval 
protection. In early times it was considered imperative to protect seacoast towns from 
attack by enemy war vessels, and it was, therefore, thought to be only just tltnt the Crown 
sbonld require these towns to_furnish the necessary ships and to man them. This was not 
a confiscation of private property without compensation, but a method whereby the Crown 
required the assessment of a tax upon the inhabitants by the local governing authorities. 
The ship-owner always received compensation. John Selden, The Dominion of the Sen (a 
re-puhlication in English in 1652 of Mare Clausum, 1635), 352; Holdsworth, The Power 
of the Crown to Requisition Ships in a National Entergency, (1919) 35 L.Q.Rev. 12, 24, 30; 
Scott & Hildesley, The Case of Requisition, 148-155, especially 150; see: Sir Michael 
Foster in Rex v. Broadfoot, Foster, Crown Cases, 154, 160 (1743); contra: Lord Duke, 
dissenting, in In re De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1919] 2 Ch. 197, 250, 88 LJ.Ch. 415, 120 
LT.Rep. 396, 63 S.J. 445, 35 T.L.R. 418 (1919) (intermediate appeal of Att'y-Gen'l v. 
De Keyser's Royal Hotel, discussed infra in this note). Charles 1 devised the plan of 
extending the ship levies throughout the kingdom, thus further freeing himself from con· 
trol by Parliament. The interesting history of this effort, and the controversy it provoked, 
terminating in the defeat of the Crown through the abolition by Parliament of all forms 
of ship-money in 1640, is to be found in 2 Rushworth's Historical Collections of Private 
Passages of State (London, 1721), 257, 259, 323, 353, 355, 359 nnd 364, and in 3 Rush· 
worth's, etc., 991, 1182 and 1395. The Case of Ship-Money (Rex v. Hampden), 3 State 
Trials, 826, 3 Rushworth's, etc., 480 (1637), wherein a majority of the judges upheld 
Charles I, has remained a landmark in English history, but nowhere in the constitutional 
struggle does there appear a suggestion that the property of the individual suhject is to be 
taken from him without compensation. (It must be horne in mind continually that this 
discussion has no application to acts in the course of military operations.) 
The Zamora, [1916] 2 A.C. 77, 85 L.J.P. 89, 2 P.Cns. I, 114 L.T.Rep. 626, 60 S.J. 
416, 32 T.L.R. 436 (1916), involved the right of angary, i.e., requisition of the property of 
a neutral, as applied to copper in the possession of the Prize Court. In the opinion there 
appears a rather inexplicable dictum by Lord Parker (p. 100) : "The municipal law of this 
country does not give compensation to a subject whose land or goods are requisitioned by 
the Crovm." This statement was approved in the dissenting opinion of Lord Duke in In re 
De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1919] 2 Ch. 197, 245, 88 L.J.Ch. 415, 120 L.T.Rcp. 396, 63 S.J. 
445, 35 T.L.R. 418 (1919). In Att'y-Gen'l v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508, 
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89 LJ.Ch. 417, 122 L.T.Rep. 691, 64 S.J. 513, 36 T.L.R. 600 (1920), none of the judges 
passed upon the question, hut Lord Sumner thought the dictum was not meant to he applied 
to the point now under consideration (pp. 564 & 565), aud Lord Parmoor did not take it 
seriously (pp. 572 & 573). 
Newcastle Breweries, Ltd., v. King, [1920] 1 K.B. 854, 89 L.J.K.B. 392, 123 L.T.Rep. 
58, 84 J.P. 125, 18 L.G.R. 781, 36 TL.R. 276 (1920), involved the validity of regulations 
issued by the naval authorities, under which they had requisitioned certain rum. lV[r. 
Justice Salter, interpreting the legislation under which the regulations were issued, held that 
the government could not give the subject less than the preseut cash market value of his 
property, and could not deprive him of his right to a judicial ascertainment of the same. 
On the latter point, the decision 1vas approved by Lord Dunedin in a dictum in Att'y-Gen'l 
v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel. On both points, a contrary decision was reached in Hudson's 
Bay Co. v. Maclay, [1920] W.N. 170, 36 T.L.R. 469 (1920), and in Robinson & Co. v. 
King, [1921] 3 K.B. 183, 90 L.J.K.B. 1177, 125 L.T.Rep. 675, 37 T.L.R. 698 (1921). This 
difference of opinion is ouly as to how compensation is to he ascertained. There is agree-
ment that compensation is required, and it is assumed by the latter courts that an execu-
tive determination of the amount will he just. In. the Hudson's Bay case, Mr. Justice 
Greer expressly recognizes that a regulation giving no award, or one at a negligible rate, 
would not he an honest and bona fide exercise of the administrative powers. War-time 
conditions affect market prices to such an extent that a different measure of value well may 
he thought to constitute just compensation. Cf.: Highland v. Russell Car & Snowplow Co., 
279 U.S. 253, 279, 49 Sup.Ct. 314, 317, 73 L.Ed. 688, 692 (1929). 
In re A Petition of Right (In re X's Petition of Right), [1915] 3 K.B. 649, 84 
LJ.K.B. 1961, 113 L.T.Rep. 575, 59 S.J. 665, 31 T.L.R. 596 (1915), appeal to the House of 
Lords withdrawn by consent, [1916] W.N. 311 (1916), overruled, see infra, related to the 
taking of land for the Shoreham Aerodrome, which was used for the manufacture and 
storage of airplanes and other related articles. It was decided, both in the King's Bench 
Division and in the Court of Appeal (both opiuions being reported in the citations given), 
that the government was not required to make compensation to the owners of the land, upon 
two grounds: first, that under modern conditions of warfare_ the taking was to he con-
sidered as made in the course of active military operations; and second, that Parliament 
had, by the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act, 5 Geo.V, c.8, §1, authorized the 
issuance of regulations suspending restrictions upon the acquisition of land, and that the 
regulations had removed the "restriction" of making compensation. See a criticism of this 
case in Holdsworth, The Power of the Crown to Requisition British Ships in a National 
Emergency, (1919) 35 L.Q.Rev.·12, 29. A dictum in harmony with the decision appears 
in Sheffield Conservative & UnioiJ.ist Club v. Brighten, [1916] W.N. 277, 85 L.J.K.B. 1669, 
32 T.L.R. 598 (1916). 
Att'y-Gen'l v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1920] A.C. 508, 89 L.J.Ch. 417, 122 L.T.Rep. 
691, 64 S.J. 513, 36 T.L.R. 600 (1920), will remain a leading case in this connection. While 
it does not pass upon the question of the existence of a Crown prerogative to take property 
for war purposes without compensation, the nature of the decision is such that the question 
probably will never he adjudicated by the English courts. The snit involved the question 
of compeusation to the owners of a large hotel in the city of London, taken for head-
quarters of the Royal Flying Corps. In the trial court, 34 T.L.R. 329, the questions of law 
were not argued, and the petition was dismissed upon the authority of In re A Petition of 
Right, [1915] 3 K.B. 649, 84 L.J.K.B. 1961, 113 L.T.Rep. 575, 59 S.J. 665, 31 T.L.R. 
596 (1915), supra. In the Court of Appeal, In re De Keyser's Royal Hotel, [1919] 2 Ch. 
197, 88 L.J.Ch. 415, 120 L.T.Rep. 396, 63 S.J. 445, 35 TL.R. 418 (1919), the decision was 
reversed. The majority distinguished In re A Petition of Right upon the ground that it 
related to a matter in the course of military operations. They felt that the existence of a 
Crown prerogative to take property throughout the kingdom for war purposes without com-
pensation had not been established, hut held that, in any event, where powers previously 
within the prerogative have been fully provided for by Parliamentary legislation the pre-
rogative is suspended. As Parliament had done this by the enactment of the Defence Act, 
1842, 5 & 6 Viet. c.94, aud earlier statutes, it 1vas not necessary to decide whether a pre-
rogative had previously existed. It was also pointed out that, whi1e the Act of 1914, 5 
Geo.V, c.8, conferred authoritY- to issue regulations removing restrictions upon the acquisi-
tion of land, the regulations were to he "for securing the public safety and the defeuce 
of the realm," and that it was not necessary for those purposes that the right of the subject 
to compensation he removed. The regulations did not attempt to do this expressly, and if 
they were to he so interpreted they would he ultra vires. Hence, compensation was pay-
able in accordance with the terms of the Defence Act, 1842, 5 & 6 Viet. c.94. Lord Duke 
dissented upon the ground that the prerogative of the Crown to occupy laud anywhere in 
the kingdom as long as necessary for the public defense had been established, and that it 
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desiring not to be bound by United States v. Russell/2 could explain the actual 
decision in that case by attributing it to the common law principle rather than 
to the Constitution. The more normal course of historical and constitutional 
development, nevertheless, would be to hold that the just compensation clause 
was adopted into the Constitution in accordance with the pre-existing common 
law principle, and therefore to interpret it in accordance with the common law 
distinction between takings of private property in time of war in the course of 
active military operations and takings for war purposes not of that character, 
holding the constitutional provision applicable to the latter but not to the 
former. 
But, as Mr. Justice Holmes has said, "Great cases like hard cases make 
bad law."73 The pressure of war conditions on judges in passing upon ques· 
tions of national policy makes impossible accurate prediction as to their action. 
In connection with the present problem, the argument of necessity will always 
he used: that if the government feels that a certain course of action is neces· 
sary in time of war it must be constitutional.74 Although the contention based 
had not been suspended by legislation. He felt that, since the current regulations under 
which the land had been taken did not provide for compensation, it would he indulging in 
a fiction against the Crown to say that the land was deemed to have been taken under the 
act of 1842. The House of Lords agreed with the majority in the Court of Appeal, except 
that it was not felt that In re A Petition of Right could he distinguished upon the ground 
that it related to active military operations, and it was overruled. . 
The opinion in In re A Petition of Right docs not fully set forth the facts involved, 
and a more detailed statement of the facts would he required in order to determine where 
the line as to what constitutes active military operations should have been dravm in that 
case. In Att'y-Gen'l v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, none of the law lords except Lord Dunedin 
expressed an opinion as to whether a prerogative to take property for war purposes without 
compensation still existed, subject to suspension by legislation, it being pointed out that 
neither the affirmative nor the negative of the proposition could he estahJjshed by reference 
to records or prior decisions. Lord Dunedin thought that from the usage of payment there 
could not he imposed on the Crown a customary obligation to pay (p. 525). Sir John Simon 
has suggested that the real reason why the Court of Appeal declined to he hound by In re 
A Petition of Right was not because of any difference in the facts, hut because of the 
historical research in the De Keyser case. Simon, Introduction to Scott & Hildcslcy, The 
Case of Requisition, xxi. 
In 8 Encyc. of the Laws of England, 1, in an article entitled "Land Clauses Acts," 
Mr. W. F. Craies says: "In theory the Crown bas the prerogative of expropriating the lands 
of subjects for the purpose of the defence of the realm." The only decision cited, Att'y· 
Gen'l v. Tomline, 12 Ch. 214 (1879), does not support the proposition. 
Mr. District Judge Smith, in Beatty v. United States, 203 Fed. 620, 624 (C.C.A. 4th 
Cir. 1913), certiorari denied, 232 U.S. 463, 34 Sup. Ct. 392, 58 L.Ed. 686 (1914), said: 
"By the constitution of England, Parliament was supreme. 1 Black. Comm. 160-162. It 
could do anything. • •• It could therefore take private property for public usc without 
compensation; hut there had grown up a system of construction in England, so continuous 
and uniform as to become fundamental law, that Parliament would not take private prop· 
erty for private uses, nor would it take private property for public uses without just com· 
pensation." 
1213 Wall.(U.S.) 623, 20 L.Ed. 474 (1871). 
73Dissenting opinion in Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400, 
24 Sup.Ct. 436, %8, 48 L.Ed. 679, 726 (1903). Continuing: "For great cases arc called 
great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, hut because 
of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and dis-
torts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which 
makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled prin· 
ciples of law will bend." · 
74Mr. Justice Strong, in Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis (Legal Tender Cases), 12 
Wall.(U.S.) 457, 533-534, 20 L.Ed. 287, 306 (1871): "It certainly was intended to confer 
upon the government the power of sell-preservation •••• That would appear, then, to be a 
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upon necessity has been repudiated definitively as an absolute proposition,75 it 
must always be of great force in dealing ·with novel specific situations. 
A general system of taking private property for war purposes through a 
universal draft would present legal problems of a character differing from 
those involved in proceedings directed against isolated individuals; to date, 
only the latter type has been considered by the courts in this connection. It is 
possible to contend that, under the existing constitutional provisions, regard-
less of the language used in the decisions of the courts, the real objection to 
legality in taking property from individuals has been, not the just compensa-
tion clause, but the requirements of the due process of law clause.76 As long 
as only the property of isolated individuals is taken, it may be said that, under 
the due process of law provision, fairness to the individual requires that he be 
compensated. When Congress, by an act with provisions reasonably adapted 
to the purpose in view, has called upon citizens generally, or members of a 
class of citizens, to give up their property through a universal draft, then fair-
ness to the individual does not require that he be compensated. The difficulty 
confronted in this line of thought is that it seems to lead to this dilemma: if 
the universal draft requires a special sacrifice from an individual, which would 
no doubt be the case, fairness to the individual still requires that he be com-
pensated; if it is to be conceived that he is not being called upon for any spe-
cial contribution, then the universal draft is being used as a method of direct 
taxation, and the Constitution requires that the tax he apportioned among the 
several statcs.77 (This, it may be assumed, would not be practicable.) 
Also, it may be assumed that due process of law requires that any method 
of classification of property for purposes of a universal draft must be reason-
able, that the draft must be conducted without depriving any person of the 
most unreasonable construction of the Constitution which denies to the government CJ;eated 
by it, the right to employ freely every means, not prohibited, necessary for its preservation, 
and for the fulfilment of its acknowledged duties." 
75Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall.(U.S.) 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 (1866); United States v. L. Coheu 
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 41 Sup.Ct. 298, 65 L.Ed. 516 (1920). 
76The just compensation clause may be considered only a specific aspect of the more 
general provision of the due process of law clause. 
"Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings instituted for the taking of 
private property for public use means, therefore, such process as recognizes the right of the 
o1·mer to be compensated if his property be wrested from him and transferred to the 
public." l\fr. Justice Harlan, in (;4icago, Burlington, etc., R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 
236, 17 Sup.Ct. 581, 584, 41 L.Ed. 979, 984 (1897). 
"H the nature and conditions of a restriction upon the use or disposition of property 
is sueh that a State could, under the police power, impose it consistently with the Four-
teenth Amendment without making compensation, then the United States may for a per-
mitted purpose impose a like restriction consistently with the Fifth Amendment without 
making compensation; ••. " l\fr. Justice Brandeis, in Hamilton v. Keutucky Distilleries 
Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156, 40 Sup.Ct. 106, 108, 64 L.Ed. 194, 199 (1919), upholding the 
validity of war-time prohibition. 
It is to be remembered that there is no just compensation clause in the federal Con-
stitution relating to the States, and that both the due process of law and just compensation 
clauses appear in the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal govermnent. 
It has been suggested that there has been slightly greater liberality in favor of con-
stitutionality under the Fifth than under the Fourteenth Amendment. Unsigned note, Dis-
similarities in Content Between the Two Due Process Clauses of the Federal Constitution, 
(1929) 29 Col.L.Rev. 624. 
77See footnote #6, supra. 
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equal protection of the laws.78 It has been necessary to satisfy this require· 
ment in classifying human beings for purposes of conscription, and in doing 
so it has been held that individuals may he exempted from military service he· 
cause of the value to the government in time of war of their continued activities 
in the civilian pursuits in which they already have been engaged. As to those 
remaining, a lottery system is fair and reasonable for the particular purpose.70 
But in requiring a sacrifice of material resources a lottery system may not he 
practicable or necessary, and it may he doubted whether a distinction based 
upon value of property to the government for war purposes would he upheld. 
While the parallel suggested indicates that it might he, it does not necessarily 
follow that the same sort of distinction would he considered proper for a dif-
ferent purpose. It should he noted also that in selecting human beings the 
value of their services in civilian pursuits for war purposes is made the basis of 
exemption from war sacrifice, whereas in dealing with material resources the 
opposite would he the case-the value for war purposes would he used as the 
basis for requirement of sacrifice. One other parallel may he noted-that 
able-bodied citizens are taken for personal war service while the infirm are 
relieved. This is not due, however, to any principle of classification as such, 
hut is forced upon the government as a matter of necessity in view of the nature 
of the service required. 
Let it h~ supposed that the first case involving the validity of a universal 
draft is that of a corporation which has been manufacturing munitions. It has 
made special preparations to serve, and has habitually dealt with, the govern· 
ment in that particular capacity in time of peace. Might it not he felt that a 
selection of the property of the corporation for taking under a universal draft, 
because of its value for war purposes, would constitute a penalty for having 
dealt with the government? It is conceivable that the whole force of patriotic 
pressure might he against constitutionality. 
In reply to the argument of necessity to uphold the universal draft, it is 
possible to point out that the past wars of this country have been waged sue· 
cessfully without resor,t to that expedient. If a universal draft were to he put 
into operation without change in the Constitution, and it were to he held uncon· 
stitutional by the courts, the only effect would he to benefit certain individuals, 
- and proportionately increase the national debt. A national debt, except as to 
foreign flotations, represents only an indebtedness upon the part of one portion 
of the people of the country to another, and a court might he fearful that the 
new experiment would not call forth the energies of the people to the fullest 
extent. If conditions were such that it seemed possible that a substantial por· 
tion of the increase in the national debt could he floated in foreign countries, 
interference with that possibility by the universal draft might he regretted. 
When a military enterprise has once been undertaken, expense is a secondary 
78While there is no equal protection of the laws clause applicable to the federal 
government, the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment includes such requirement. 
Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332, 42 Sup.Ct. 124, 129, 66 
L.Ed. 254, 263 (1921). , 
79Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 38 Sup.Ct. 159, 62 L.Ed. 349, L.R.A.1918C, 
361, Ann.Cas.1918B, 856 (1918). 
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consideration-witness the "cost plus" system during the World War,80 which 
was extravagant when measured by business standards, yet which was felt to 
he justified because of the immediate results obtained. 
The concept of choice upon the part of the government has been the basic 
principle upon which, since long prior to Vattel, a solution of such problems 
as the present one has been sought. It has, perhaps, never been better expressed 
that in the famous Lawrence Committee Report: 
" ••. the question arises whether there is a deliberate voluntary tak-
ing of property for public use requiring compensation, or whether 
those acts arise from and are governed by the law of overruling 
military necessity-mere accidents of war inevitably and unavoidably 
incidental to its operations-and which by international law impose 
no obligation to make recompense .•.. 
"There is no reason why one citizen should furnish quarter-
master's or commissary supplies rather than another. The Government 
can, as to these, exercise a discretion; it can buy from any who have 
to sell, or select those from whom it will impress. Here is a deliberate 
voluntary taking for public use."81 
If the existing constitutional provisions are interpreted in the light of this 
distinction, an act of Congress providing for a draft of material resources in 
time of war will he held unconstitutional. 
This discussion may he closed with illustrations of the contrasting points 
of view in regard to the effect of war-time necessity, a choice between which 
·will have a great deal to do with a court's decision. There is a temptation to 
assume the attitude thus expressed by Mr. Judge Andrews of the New York 
Court of Appeals: 
"On December 28, 1917, under authority of an act of congress, 
the president entered into 'possession, use, control and operation' of 
the New York Central railroad and later fixed a rate of fare upon that 
road, for all passengers, at three cents a mile. This action was not 
justified by any of the ordinary rules of law. It can be sustained 
solely as the exercise of the war powers of the United States. And 
these powers are not limited by these ordinary rules. They are not 
hounded by any specific grant of authority. They are not unlike what 
in the states we call the police power, but the police power raised to 
the highest degree. They are such powers as are essential to preserve 
the very life of the nation itself. When requisite to this end the 
liberty of the citizen-the protection of private property-the peace-
time rights of the states must all yield to necessity."82 
80Under this system, the compensation of a contractor consisted of a stipulated per-
centage of all amounts spent for labor and materials, all of which were paid by the govern-
ment. A system more productive of extravagance could scarcely be imagined. 
SlReport of the House Committee on War-Claims, entitled War-Claims and Claims 
of Aliens, by William Lawrence, March 26, 1874, House Rep. #262, Forty-third Congress, 
1st Session, 40. 
82Public Service Comm. v. New York Central R.R., 230 N.Y. 149, 152, 129 N.E. 455, 
456, 14 A.L.R. 449, 451 (1920). 
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On the other hand, Mr. Judge Jenkins, of the Confederate Supreme Court 
of Georgia, acting under the just compensation clause of the Confederate Con· 
stitution, held that war necessity could not justify the seizure of supplies 
throughout the Confederacy without compensation, and, in so holding, said: 
"Much has been said, and eloquently saia, of the imperiled con-
dition of the country, and the fatal consequences likely to result from 
judicial interference with the war measures of the Government; but 
let it be remembered that by a provision of the instrument itself, 
Judges as well as legislators, are sworn 'to support the Constitution;' 
and this they are to do in war, as well as in peace. We yield to none 
in respect for the Congress of the Confederate States; we would at 
ail times, and especially in times like the pre5ent, most reluctantly 
dissent from their construction of the Constitution; we would, in cases 
of doubtfpl meaning, incline to give them the benefit of the doubt, for 
the safety of the country. Beyond this point of concession, not even 
war, with its attendant horrors, may rightfully impel the judiciary. 
Positive conviction of constitutional obligation may not be yielded 
under any circumstances."88 
For a statement of the position of justices of the United States Supreme 
Court, we :tnay return to Ex parte Milligan,84 already quoted.86 In another 
83Cunningham v. Campbell, 33 Ga. 625, 633-634 (Confederate, 1863). Mr. Judge 
Jenkins also held (p. 626) that the securing of supplies for future military purposes did 
not constitute a case of absolute necessity: 
"Much has been said of 'necessity,' of 'urgent necessity,' of a law older than and 
superior to the Constitution, styled the 'salus populi.' Labored efforts have been made to 
prove on the one hand that this is, and on the other hand that it is not, a case of urgent 
necessity; on the one hand that the seizure was, and on the other that it was not made in 
virtue of that unwritten 'suprema lex.' I remark, first, that inexorable necessity is the 
comer-stone of the supreme law, here characterized as above all written constitutions, 
recognized and obeyed, because without it there is no safety for the people. This necessity 
is everywhere, and at all times a creature of the present, is never discovered hy provision, 
but looms up and asserts itself in the inevitable now. It discloses present evil menacing 
the body politic, and demands a present and sure remedy. The procedure, of which the 
defendants in error complained in the Court below, is the result of forecast, intended to 
provide for the future foreseen wants .••• 
''It does not appear that the seizures in this case were made by order of any General 
commanding an army, a department, corps, division, brigade, or detached party or post. 
We are, therefore, unauthorized to assume that they were made to meet an immediate neces· 
sity. The order came from the Chief Commissary in the district of Georgia, who acts in 
direct subordination to the Commissary-General, under whose direction impressments to 
accumulate supplies are made. The correctness of this view appears, secondly, from the 
fact that these sugars were neither consumed nor removed in the interval between tl1e 
seizure and the date of the warrants, a period of three months. This, then, was not a case 
of 'extreme necessity,' inducing and justifying .action upon the principle 'salus populi, 
suprema lex.' It was a proceeding authorized hy statute, for which conformity to a written 
Constitution is claimed. 
"Again, I remark, that the word necessity docs not occur in the clause of the Con· 
stitution conferring or recognizing the power of impressment. The 16th paragraph, 9th 
section, 1st article, after providing sundry safeguards to personal rights, concludes tlms: 
'nor shall private property be taken /or public use, without just compensation.' It is not, 
'nor shall private property be taken to meet a public necessity, but for public use,' etc." 
The Confederacy had no Supreme Court. Constitution of the Confederate States of 
America; Nathaniel W. Stephenson, The Day of the Confederacy, 39. It is an interesting 
speculation whether the attitude of such a court would have been the same. 
84/f Wall.(U.S.) 2, 120, 18 L.Ed. 281, 295 (1866). 
85Supra, at footnote #20. 
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celebrated case, United States v. Lee,86 that Court was called upon to determine 
the title to the Arlington National Cemetery and other portions of the famous 
Arlington Estate. The property had been purchased by the government at a 
tax sale conducted by commissioners appointed under act of Congress to col-
lect direct taxes in the insurrectionary districts during the Civil War. The sale 
was held to be without due process of law hecause of a rule of the tax com-
missioners that the taxes cotrld be paid only by the owner in person. In the 
opinion, Mr. Justice Miller said: 
"The evils supposed to grow out of the possible interference of 
judicial action with the exercise of powers of the government essential 
to some of its most important operations, will be seen to be small 
indeed compared to this evil [unconstitutional action by the execu-
tive], and much diminished, if they do not wholly disappear, upon 
a recurrence to a few considerations. 
"One of these, of no little significance, is, that during the exist-
ence of the government for now nearly a century under the present 
Constitution, with this principle and the practice under it well estab-
lished, no injury from it has come to that government. During this 
time at least nvo wars, so serious as to call into exercise all the 
powers and all the resources of the government, have been conducted 
to a successful issue."87 
Any statement as to what the law is on any point is merely a prediction as 
to the eonduct of judges in the future under certain eonditions. No one can 
predict accurately their reactions in regard to the constitutionality of a novel 
expedient such as a universal draft. It is to be expected that their mental 
processes will be affected by the stresses due to war conditions. Particularly 
is it impossible to predict the effect of this, when it cannot be foreseen whether, 
if the expedient is tried, it will come before the courts during the war, or after-
wards in time of peace, nor whether the character of the war will be a desper-
ate struggle for national existence or a minor eonflict. This only can be said: 
if an attempt to take the profit out of war by a draft of material resources is 
to be made, the only certain way to insure legality is through constitutional 
amendment. 88 
aa106 U.S. 196, 1 Sup.Ct. 240, 27 L.Ed. 171 (1882). 
87United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 221, 1 Sup.Ct. 240, 261,27 L.Ed. 171, 182 (1882). 
Four members of the Court dissented upon the ground that the action was a suit against 
the United States. 
SSThe following is suggested as a form of amendment: In time of war the Congress 
shall have power to take private property for public use, with complete or partial com· 
pensation, or without compensation. The method of selection of the property to be taken 
and of determination of the amount of compensation, if any, to be paid may be administra· 
tive or legislative, and shall -not be subject to any provisions of the Constitution other than 
this amendment. 
